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Abstract
With the advent of wide security platforms able to
express simultaneously all the policies comprising an
organization’s global security policy, the problem of
inconsistencies within security policies become harder
and more relevant.
We have defined a tool based on the CHR language
which is able to detect several types of inconsisten-
cies within and between security policies and other
specifications, namely workflow specifications.
Although the problem of security conflicts has been
addressed by several authors, to our knowledge none
has addressed the general problem of security incon-
sistencies, on its several definitions and target speci-
fications.
1 Introduction
Over the years several access control policies have
been proposed in the literature. Although these poli-
cies cover many different situations and types of infor-
mation, they are often considered in isolation. Thus,
they are not suitable for organizations with complex
structures, that manage simultaneously several types
of information, thus requiring the simultaneous use
of different access control policies. Moreover, policies
are often scattered over different environments, mak-
ing understanding and managing of global policies
much more difficult.
Recently there has been a considerable interest in
environments that support multiple and complex ac-
cess control policies, [5, 11, 16, 13]. The goal of these
environments is to provide support for the definition
of all the policies that makes up the global security
policy of an organization into one single platform,
thus simplifying management and consistency main-
tenance.
Some of these environments provide mechanisms to
solve potential conflicts between contradictory poli-
cies. Some of these mechanisms use special ad-hoc
rules to decide upon the acceptability of an action
whenever a conflict arises [11]; others use properties
such as “authorship”, “specificity” and “recency” of
security policies to decide on their priority [5, 12];
or combine policies through special operators which
decide on the policies’ applicability [13].
These mechanisms are used to solve conflicts re-
sulting from the existence of implicit rules in common
language. For instance, a user specifies that all his
files should not be read by any one else, and simul-
taneously, he specifies that the files with information
about a particular project should be accessible by
all members of the project. This situation is not a
conflict in common language since the second rule is
obviously an exception to the first, but it may be a
conflict within a formal security specification.
However, these conflict solving mechanisms should
not be used to solve real inconsistencies derived from
unification of several policies from several sources. In
fact, they can even be detrimental, because they can
masquerade real inconsistencies and produce wrong
results.
Although conflicts between contradictory policies
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are the most important type of inconsistency that
may be present in a global security policy, they are
not the only ones. For instance, a policy may be
completely overridden by another policy in such a
way that the former policy is completely useless; or
the combination of two or more policies may result
in a policy that denies every action in the system.
Furthermore, within an organization, it is not
enough to verify the security policy self-consistency,
it is also necessary to verify the consistency of the
security policy with other specifications of the orga-
nization. For instance, if an organization’s workflow
application requires access to some documents and
the security policy forbids that access, then the se-
curity policy is inconsistent with that workflow spec-
ification, which may prevent the organization from
working as expected.
In fact, given the constraint nature of security poli-
cies, any specification document of an organization
which comprises one or more constraints, may be a
source of inconsistencies. Thus, the search for se-
curity policy inconsistencies does not have a closed
solution valid for every organization and situation.
Each organization may have different specifications
with constraints and different interpretations of se-
curity policy inconsistencies.
This paper’s contribution is twofold: First, we ad-
dress the general problem of checking for security
policy inconsistencies, whatever they are, on large
complex policies; then we address the problem of
finding inconsistencies between security policies and
other specifications with constraints, namely work-
flow specifications. Both problems are addressed
within a novel approach comprising a tool developed
by us (PCV – Policy Consistency Verifier), based on
the CHR constraint language [8], which finds incon-
sistencies within and between security policies and
other specifications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We
first briefly describe the CHR language. Then de-
scribe the tool architecture. Sections 5 and 6 describe
how security policy and workflow specifications are
handled by the tool. Finally, in section 7 we briefly
survey some related work, and in section 8 we con-
clude the paper.
2 Constraint Handling Rules
CHR is a high-level language designed for writing
user-defined constraint systems [8]. CHR is es-
sentially a committed-choice language consisting of
guarded rules that rewrite constraints into simpler
ones until they are solved. CHR rules are of two
types: simplification rules and propagation rules.
Simplification rules replace user-defined constraints
by simpler ones. Propagation rules add new redun-
dant constraints that may be necessary to do further
simplifications.
Constraint︷ ︸︸ ︷
A ≤ B ,B ≥ A︸ ︷︷ ︸
Head
⇔ true︸ ︷︷ ︸
Guard
| A = B︸ ︷︷ ︸
Body
//Simplification rule
A ≤ B,B ≤ C ⇒ true | A ≤ C // Propagation rule
X < Y \X 6= Y ⇔ true. // Simpagation rule
Figure 1: Example of CHR rules.
A CHR rule consists of three parts: a head, a guard
and a body (Figure 1). Each part is a conjunction
of constraints. There are two kinds of constraints,
user-defined and built-in constraints. User-defined
constraints are relations that must hold between one
or more entities, which assume the form of predicates
or operations over those entities (e.g. less(1,2) or 1
< 2). Built-in constraints are simple constraints that
can be directly solved by the underlying solver (e.g.
A = B).
A simplification rule works by replacing the con-
straints in the rule’s head by the constraints in the
rule’s body, provided the constraints in the rule’s
guard are true. A propagation rule adds the con-
straints in the body but keeps the constraints in the
head (Figure 1). Figure 1 shows also a third type of
rule named “simpagation”. A “simpagation” rule is
equivalent to a simplification rule with some of the
heads repeated in the body. On a “simpagation” rule
only the heads after the “\” sign are removed.
2
3 Overview of PCV
Security policies can be seen as collections of con-
straints more or less structured (depending on the
security platform used) into complex rules and poli-
cies. These constraints may be as simple as “A mid-
dle manager cannot approve purchases over a spec-
ified amount”, or they can be as complex as con-
straints comprising forms of prohibition, permission
or obligation of user actions.
Given the constraint nature of security policies,
the PCV verifier is a natural candidate to be im-
plemented with a constraint language such as the
CHR language. This approach simplifies tool con-
struction and potentiates its extensibility to other
inconsistency definitions.
PCV is composed by five layers (Figure 2). The
first layer is the CHR symbolic solver engine, which
is the only layer not comprised of CHR rules. The
second layer is composed by the rules which handle
basic constraint predicates (e.g. A ≤ B, a ∈ G) and
constitutes the verifier’s kernel. The third layer con-
tains the rules which comprise the knowledge on how
to decompose the specific constraints placed by each
type of specification (security, workflow), into basic
constraints. The fourth layer contains rules resulting
from the compilation of the different specifications
(e.g. security policy specification, workflow specifi-
cation). Finally, the fifth layer contains the verifier
goals, with the definitions of the security inconsisten-
cies being searched.
The purpose of this layering approach is threefold:
(i) it simplifies the handler design, because each type
of constraints can be handled independently; (ii) it
simplifies the proof of correctness, because each layer
has no knowledge of the layers on top and see the
constraints of lower layers as built-ins; (iii) it sim-
plifies the addition of new specification handlers, by
defining the rules required by each specification.
Briefly, the process by which inconsistencies are
found works as follows. First the constraints within
each specification being verified are compiled into
CHR rules. Second, the PCV verifier is invoked with
the constraint goals comprising the inconsistency def-
initions. These goals are successively decomposed
into simpler constraints, by the rules generated by the
Security Policy CR Spec.. CR
Symbolic solver engine
Security CH
Security
policy
specification
Compilation
Workflow
specification
Workflow CH 
Compilation
Other
specifications
Other CH
Consistency definitons
Compilation
Solving Rules Kernel
Spec. CR
1st layer
2nd layer
3 rd layer
4 th layer
5 th layer
Security
rules
Workflow
rules
Figure 2: The consistency verifier architecture.
CH stands for Constraint Handler, and CR stands
for Constraint Rules
compilers (fourth layer), and by the rules compris-
ing the knowledge on each specification type (third
layer), until they can be solved by the kernel rules.
In the following sections we proceed by describing
each of these layers. For the sake of simplicity, each
of the third, fourth and fifth layers were split in two
(Figure 2), separating the rules of each layer that
handle security constraints from the rules that handle
other constraints.
4 Kernel rules
The verifier’s kernel rules are responsible for handling
basic constraints, resulting from the application of
simple operators to basic entities.
Kernel rules are divided into two major groups:
rules to handle order and equality operators (>, <,
≤, ≥, =, 6=); and rules to handle membership and set
constraints (∈, /∈, ∪ (union), ∩ (meet), # (cardinal-
ity), [ ] (index)).
4.1 Order and equality rules
The rules to handle order and equality constraints de-
rive from the “minmax” handler proposed by [8], aug-
mented with optional temporal qualifiers but without
the “min” and “max” constraints.
A constraint may be timed or timeless. A timed
constraint results from applying a temporal qualifier
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to a timeless constraint (e.g. X < Y becomes X <
Y atT ). Timed constraints, by opposition to timeless
constraints, are only valid at an instant T.
Knowing how to handle timed constraints is of ut-
most importance for checking for security policy in-
consistencies. Many security policies use the notion
of time when specifying dependencies from past and
future events. For instance, history-based policies
like the Chinese Wall policy [7] use the notion of time
to allow access to an object only if the same user has
not accessed another object in the same class of in-
terest. Another example is given by obligation-based
policies which use the notion of time to ensure that
some action happens in the future [14].
H1, . . . ,Hn ⇒ G|B1, . . . , Bm.
derives
2
n
−1


H1 at T, . . . ,Hn ⇒ G|B1 atT, . . . , Bm atT.
. . .
H1, . . . ,Hn atT ⇒ G|B1 atT, . . . , Bm atT.
. . .
H1 at T, . . . ,Hn atT ⇒ G|B1 atT, . . . , Bm atT.
and
H
′
1, . . . ,H
′
n
⇔ G′|B′1, . . . , B
′
m
.
derives
2
n
−1


H ′
n
, . . . \H ′1 at T ⇔ G
′|B′1 atT, . . . , B
′
m
atT.
. . .
H ′1, . . . \H
′
n
at T ⇔ G|B′1 atT, . . . , B
′
m
atT.
. . .
H ′1 atT, . . . ,H
′
n
atT ⇔ G|B′1 atT, . . . , B
′
m
atT.
Figure 3: Template rules to build timed propaga-
tion and timed simplification rules from their timeless
counterparts.
The rules which handle timed constraints derive
from the rules which handle timeless constraints in
accordance with the templates in Figure 3. A timeless
rule with n constraints in its head derive 2n−1 timed
rules, each with a different combination of timed and
timeless heads. The template rules for timed simpli-
fication rules are slightly different from the template
rules for timed propagation rules. Timed simplifica-
tion rules only remove timed constraints. The time-
less constraints used to activate each rule are not re-
moved to preserve the activation sequence of timeless
rules and therefore maintain their correctness.
built in @ X=Y at T ⇔ ground(X), ground(Y )|X = Y.
reflexivity @ X=X at T ⇔ true.
commutativity @ X=Y at T \ Y=X at T ⇔ true.
subsumption @ X=Y at T \ Y≤X at T ⇔ X 6=Y |true.
subsumption @ X=Y at T \X≤Y at T ⇔ X 6=Y |true.
irreflexivity @ X=Y at T, Y<X(at T )⇔ fail.
irreflexivity @ X=Y at T, X<Y (at T )⇔ fail.
tautology @ X=Y at T, Y 6=X(at T )⇔ fail.
tautology @ X=Y at T, X 6=Y (at T )⇔ fail.
% Transitivity rules
WithSelf @ X=Y at T, X=Z at T ⇒ X 6=Y 6=Z|Y=Z at T.
WithSelf @ X=Y at T, Y=Z at T ⇒ X 6=Y 6=Z|X=Z at T.
WithSelf @ X=Y at T, Z=X atT ⇒ X 6=Y 6=Z|Y=Z at T.
WithSelf @ X=Y at T, Z=Y at T ⇒ X 6=Y 6=Z|X=Z at T.
WLessOrEqual@ X=Y at T, X≤Z(at T )⇒ X 6=Y 6=Z|Y≤Z at T.
WLessOrEqual@ X=Y at T, Y≤Z(at T )⇒ X 6=Y 6=Z|X≤Z at T.
WLessOrEqual@ X=Y at T, Z≤X(at T )⇒ X 6=Y 6=Z|Z≤Y at T.
WLessOrEqual@ X=Y at T, Z≤Y (at T )⇒ X 6=Y 6=Z|Z≤X atT.
.
.
.
Figure 4: Rules to handle timed equality. (atT )
stands for an optional time qualification. Although
strict CHR rules do not allow optional elements, they
are used here to simplify the description.
Although the rules generated by the application
of the template rules of Figure 3 are sufficient to
handle every timed constraint derived from a user-
defined timeless constraint, they cannot handle the
timed constraints derived from built-in timeless con-
straints. While timeless-equality constraints are han-
dled by the underlying built-in solver, the same is not
true for timed-equality constraints (X=Y at T ) which
require rules such as the ones in Figure 4. These rules
can be divided in two groups: the first is composed of
simplification rules describing redundancies and con-
flicts between timed equality constraints and other
constraints; the second consists of propagation rules
describing the transitivity properties between timed
equality constraints and other constraints.
4.2 Set and membership rules
Set constraints are not handled as usual. Since the
verifier is to be used primarily on non-instantiated
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tautology @ X ∈ G,X /∈ G⇒ fail.
identity @ C = A ∩A ⇔ C = A.
commutativity @ C = A ∩B \ C = B ∩ A ⇔ true.
distributivity @ X ∈ C,C = A ∩ B ⇒ A 6= B|X ∈ A, X ∈ B.
revDist @ X ∈ A,X ∈ B,C = A ∩B ⇒ A 6= B|X ∈ C.
revNotDist @ X /∈ A,C = A ∩ B ⇒ X /∈ C.
revNotDist @ X /∈ B,C = A ∩ B ⇒ X /∈ C.
notDistrib @ X /∈ C,X ∈ A,C = A ∩ B ⇒ X /∈ B.
notDistrib @ X /∈ C,X ∈ B,C = A ∩ B ⇒ X /∈ A.
revDist @ labeling,X ∈ A,C = A ∩ B ⇒ A 6= B|
((X /∈ B,X /∈ C); (X ∈ C,X ∈ B)).
revDist @ labeling, X ∈ B,C = A ∩B ⇒ A 6= B|
((X /∈ A,X /∈ C); (X ∈ A,X ∈ C)).
notDistrib @ labeling, X /∈ C,C = A ∩ B ⇒ A 6= B|
(X /∈ A;X /∈ B).
Figure 5: Basic rules for membership and meet con-
straints.
specifications, when most sets are yet undefined –
in the sense that their members are not yet known–
it is not possible to directly solve in order to their
contents. Instead of solving set constraints, we use
them to derive membership constraints which can be
directly solved. For instance, using the “distributiv-
ity” rule, followed by the “tautology” rule of Figure
5, the goal 〈C = A ∩B,X ∈ C,X /∈ B〉 leads to a fail
state.
Membership constraints may also be time-qualified
such as order constraints. The CHR rules to han-
dle such constraints are also derived from the tem-
plate rules of Figure 3 but applied to the CHR
rules which handle timeless membership constraints.
Timed membership constraints are very useful when
sets’ contents are dynamic, which happens to be fre-
quent in security policies, e.g. a user may have been
playing a role and now he is playing another. On
the other hand we do not provide rules to handle
timed set constraints, since most relations between
sets used in security policies (e.g. C = A ∩ B) are
fixed during the whole policy lifetime.
The last three rules of figure 5 contain disjunctions
in their bodies (the ’;’ stands for built-in disjunction),
which must be handled by test and backtracking. In
order to improve efficiency these rules should be de-
layed until there are no more constraints in the goal
to simplify. The special labeling constraint is the last
constraint in the goal to be solved. Thus, using this
constraint in the head of rules ensures that they are
activated only when all other constraints have been
already simplified.
Without further assumptions the program com-
posed by the rules in Figure 5 does not terminate, be-
cause the constraints generated by propagation rules,
may be used to generate other constraints which are
going to enable again the same rules. For instance,
the constraints derived by the “distributivity” rule
could be used by the “revDist” rule to derive the
constraint X ∈ C, which may be used again to fire
the “distributivity” rule.
However, it is possible to ensure the program ter-
mination under three new assumptions:
• The CHR solver verifies the constraint store, be-
fore introducing new constraints, to prevent the
existence of multiple copies of the same con-
straint in the constraint store1.
• Membership constraints are never removed from
the constraint store.
• Meet constraints cannot be added to the con-
straint store, by any program’s rule.
Under the first assumption the number of mem-
bership constraints in the goal store is bounded, pro-
vided that the number of variables in the initial goal
store is bounded, and that none of the rules derives
constraints with new variables. The second assump-
tion is necessary to ensure monotonicity of member-
ship constraints in the constraint store. The third
assumption is necessary to ensure monotonicity and
boundedness of meet constraints in the constraint
store.
The rules in Figure 6 are used to solve constraints
using the restriction operand(:). The restriction
operand is a binary operand between a set and a
boolean function. The operation defines a new set
comprised by all the members of the first set which
satisfy the boolean function. The strategy followed
by these rules is the same as the one followed by
the rules to handle meet constraints (Figure 5). The
1Most CHR solvers can be instructed to perform this check
by enabling the “already in store” option.
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idempotent @ C = A : R( ) \D = A : R( )⇔ C = D.
restriction @ X ∈ C,C = A : R()⇒ R(X), X ∈ A.
revRestric @ labeling, X ∈ A,C = A : R()⇒
((R(X), X ∈ C); (X /∈ C,¬R(X))).
Figure 6: Rules for set restriction constraints. The
constraint C = A : R is a short form for C = {x ∈
A : R(x)} where C and A are sets and R is a boolean
function over x
restriction constraints are used together with mem-
bership constraints to derive other membership con-
straints, and the rules containing disjunctions are de-
layed until the end of the simplification process.
% Relation with other set constraints
identity @ N1 = |L| \ N2 = |L| ⇒ N1 = N2.
meet @ NC = |C|,NA = |A|, C = A ∩B ⇒ NC ≤ NA.
meet @ NC = |C|,NB = |B|, C = A ∩ B ⇒ NC ≤ NB.
join @ NC = |C|,NA = |A|, C = A ∪B ⇒ NA ≤ NC.
join @ NC = |C|,NB = |B|, C = A ∪ B ⇒ NB ≤ NC.
restrict @ NA = |A|, NC = |C|, C = A : R ⇒ NC ≤ NA.
less N = |A| ⇒ integer(N), N < 0| fail.
% For defined sets. Sets with a specific length.
eqSetMin @ N = |L| ⇒ is list(L)| length(L,N).
% For undefined sets. Sets without a specific length.
insert @ X ∈ L,N = |L| ⇒ ¬is list(L)| member(X,L).
eqSetMin @ labeling,N = |L| ⇒
¬is list(L), integer(N), N ≥ 0|
cardinal(L,N).
lesser @ labeling, N = |L|,N < N1⇒
¬is list(L), integer(N1), N1 > 0|
cardinal(L,N1).
lesseq @ labeling, N = |L|,N ≤ N1⇒
¬is list(L), integer(N1), N1 ≥ 0|
cardinal(L,N1).
Figure 7: Rules to handle cardinality constraints.
The cardinality of set S is denoted by |S|.
The rules to handle cardinality constraints (Figure
7) may be divided into three groups. The first group
is used to derive inequality constraints between car-
dinality values of sets related by meet, union and re-
striction constraints. The second group is composed
of only one rule and is used to translate a cardinality
constraint on a defined set into the built-in predicate
length. This rule is used only if the set is completely
defined, in the sense that all its members are known.
However, as explained before, most sets are not com-
pletely defined at verification time, which makes it
impossible to know their cardinality. The third group
of rules is used to verify if at the end of the verifica-
tion process, the number of elements known to be in a
set, over which a upper bound cardinality constraint
exists does not exceed that upper bound.
5 Security Rules
As described in section 3 the rules which handle spe-
cific security constraints are divided into three related
layers: the security constraint handler; the security
policy rules resulting from the compilation of the se-
curity specification; and the consistency definition
goals. Each of these layers is dependent on the pre-
ceding and following layer and all are dependent on
the specificities of the security policy definition envi-
ronment. The security policy definition environment
used in the current prototype is the Security Policy
Language (SPL) [13]. This security language was de-
veloped by us with the purpose of specifying security
controls for complex environments where several se-
curity policies must be enabled simultaneously.
In the remaining of this section we briefly describe
SPL. Then we describe how the security CH handles
the types of constraints placed by SPL. Finally, we
describe the process of compiling SPL to CHR using
the rules provided by the security CH.
5.1 SPL
SPL is a security language designed to express poli-
cies to decide about events’ acceptability. An event’s
acceptability depends on the properties of the event
(e.g. author, target and action), on the context
at that time and on the properties of past and fu-
ture events. SPL entities are typed entities with an
explicit interface by which their properties can be
queried. Some of the entities manipulated by SPL
are internal, such as rules and policies, but most are
external, like users, files, actions, objects and events.
The properties of each external entity depends heav-
ily on the platform (operating system, workflow en-
gine) implementing it.
The language is organized in a hierarchical delega-
tion tree of security policies, in which the master pol-
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icy is the root delegation starting point. A SPL pol-
icy is a structure composed by sets and rules, whose
purpose is to express simple concepts like “separa-
tion of duty”, “information flow”, or “general access
control”.
Sets contain the entities used by the policies to
decide on event acceptability. A SPL rule is a func-
tion of events that can assume three values: “allow”,
“deny” and “notapply”. It’s purpose is to decide on
the acceptability of the current event. A rule can be
simple or composed. A simple SPL rule is a tuple
of two logical expressions. The first logical expres-
sion decides on the applicability of the rule, and the
second decides on the acceptability of the event.
A SPL rule can be composed by other SPL rules
through a specific tri-value algebra with five logic
operations: conjunction (AND); disjunction (OR);
negation (NOT); existential quantification (EXIST x
IN set rule); and universal quantification (FORALL
x IN set rule). These operations behave similarly to
their binary homonyms if the “notapply” value is not
used and the “allow” and “deny” values are used as
true and false, respectively.
Each policy has one special SPL rule called the
“query rule” which is identified by a query mark be-
fore the name that defines the policy behavior.
policy Private( user set OrgUsers ) {
object set IDocs; // Policy data
?Private: // Rule name.
event.action = “SendEmail” & // Applicability
event.target IN IDocs // expression.
:: // Separation marker.
event.par[1] IN OrgUsers // Aceptability
} // expression.
Figure 8: Simple policy stating that objects belong-
ing to IDocs can only be sent to users belonging to
OrgUsers.
Figure 8 shows a simple policy stating that docu-
ments internal to the entity defining the policy can-
not be sent to someone outside the organization. The
policy has two sets and one SPL rule: the query rule.
One of the sets is a policy parameter and contains the
users that belong to the organization. The other is
internal to the policy and contains the department’s
internal documents. The rule uses the special vari-
able “ce” to access the current event properties. The
rule’s applicability expression states that the policy
is defined only for events whose targets are depart-
ment’s internal documents internal and whose action
is to send an e-mail. The rule’s acceptability expres-
sion states that for those events that satisfy the ap-
plicability expression the only allowed events are the
ones that send the e-mail to a user of the organiza-
tion.
5.2 Security Constraint Handler
Although most SPL constraints can be handled di-
rectly by the verifier’s kernel rules, some cannot. For
instance, the constraints resulting from the logical
negation of other constraints, or the constraints re-
sulting from using the SPL tri-logical operators over
SPL rules, require some additional rules in order to
be solved.
comutativity @ A ∧ B \B ∧ A ⇔ true.
comutativity @ A ∨ B \B ∨ A ⇔ true.
comutativity @ A ∨˙B \B ∨˙A ⇔ true.
definition @ labeling \ A ∨B ⇔ A6=B|(A;B).
definition @ A ∧ B ⇔ A6=B|A,B.
definition @ A ∨˙B ⇔ A6=B|(A ∧ ¬B) ∨ (¬A ∧ B).
identity @ A ∧ A ⇔ A.
identity @ A ∨ A ⇔ A.
irreflexivity @ A ∨˙A ⇔ fail.
tautology @ ¬true⇔ fail.
tautology @ ¬fail ⇔ true.
tautology @ ¬(¬A)⇔ A.
deMorgan @ ¬(A ∧B)⇔ (negA ∨ negB).
deMorgan @ ¬(A ∨B)⇔ ¬A,¬B.
definiton @ ¬(A ∨˙B)⇔ (A ∧ B) ∨ (¬A ∧ ¬B).
reduction @ ¬(A < B(atT ))⇔ B ≤ A(atT ).
.
.
.
Figure 9: Rules to handle logical constraints. The
symbol ∨˙ stands for exclusive disjunction.
Handling logical negation is straightforward, pro-
vided that the verifier also handles logical constraint
conjunction and disjunction. The rules which handle
these constraints are shown in Figure 9. To simplify
SPL to CHR compilation we also provide some rules
to handle exclusive disjunction over constraints.
Although logical constraint conjunction and dis-
junction are handled by direct translation to their
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built-in counterparts (by the “definition” rules), their
negations are handled by the DeMorgan rules, thus
pushing negations to basic kernel constraints where
they can be handled by the “reduction” rules.
definition @ R = not r(D,A)↔ R = r(D,¬A).
commutativity @ R3 = R1 andR2 \ R4 = R2 andR1 ⇔ R4 = R3.
identity @ R3 = R1 andR1⇔ R3 = R1.
neutral @ R3 = r(fail,X) andR2 ⇔ R3 = R2.
neutral @ R3 = R1 and r(fail,X)⇔ R3 = R1.
absorb @ R3 = r(true, fail) andR2⇔ R3 = r(true, fail).
absorb @ R3 = R1 and r(true, fail)⇔ R3 = r(true, fail).
default @ R3 = r(true, true)and r(D2, A2)⇔
R3 = r(true,¬D2 ∨A2).
default @ R3 = r(D1, A1)and r(true, true)⇔
R3 = r(true,¬D1 ∨ A1).
definition @ R3 = r(D1, A1) and r(D2, A2)⇔
R3 = r(D1 ∨D2, (¬D1 ∨ A1) ∧ (¬D2 ∨A2)).
Figure 10: Rules to handle SPL’s tri-logical conjunc-
tion and negation.
The rules that handle constraints resulting from
applying SPL tri-logical operators to SPL rules are
straightforward. Most of these rules are just trans-
lations of each operator’s definition (Figure 10). For
instance, the tri-logical conjunction of two SPL rules
defined by the predicates r(D1, A1) and r(D2, A2),
in which D1 and D2 stand for the domain expres-
sions of each of the rules and A1 and A2 stand for
the acceptability expressions, is simplified to another
SPL rule defined by the predicate r(D1∨D2, (¬D1∨
A1) ∧ (¬D2 ∨ A2)) (definition rule in Figure 10).
The remaining rules reflect special situations in
which the result is known without the need to eval-
uate the definition. For instance, the result of a tri-
logical conjunction between two SPL rules in which
one of them has an empty domain is equal to the
other rule (R and r(fail, A) is R).
SPL tri-logical quantifiers are slightly more com-
plex to handle. Figure 11 shows the rules to han-
dle the universal quantifier forall(Set, T r,R) atT ,
which should be read asR = {∀x ∈ Set atT : Tr(x)}.
The rules are divided into two sets: the rules that
handle universal quantifiers over defined sets; and
the rules that handle universal quantifiers over sets
defined by membership constraints.
Both sets of rules handle the quantifiers constraints
by unfolding them to n tri-logical conjunctions. How-
% Quantification over proper sets
empty @ forall(Set, TR, R) atT ⇔ is list(Set), Set = [ ]|
R = r(fail, true).
forEach@ forall(Set, TR, R) atT ⇔ is list(Set),
Set = [X|Tail]|R = callTR(X), R = R1 andR2,
forall(Tail, TR,R2) atT.
% Quantification over undefined sets
convert @ forall(Set, Tr,R) atT ⇔ ¬is list(Set)|
forall(Set, Tr,R, []) atT.
insert @ X ∈ Set atT \ forall(Set, Tr,R, U) atT ⇔
not member(X,U)|R = Tr(X) andR2,
forall(Set, Tr,R2, [X|U ]) atT.
insert @ X ∈ Set \ forall(Set, Tr, R, U) atT ⇔
not member(X,U)|R = Tr(X) andR2,
forall(Set, Tr,R2, [X|U ]) atT.
no more@ labeling \ forall(Set, Tr,R, U) atT ⇔
R = r(fail, true).
Figure 11: Rules to handle SPL’s tri-logical universal
operator.
ever, the rules that handle quantifiers over undefined
sets require an extra constraint property to account
for the membership constraints which have already
been used with each quantification constraint (Fig-
ure 11). This account is necessary to prevent non-
termination caused by using each membership con-
straint more than once with each quantification con-
straint.
The rules to handle existential quantifier con-
straints are very similar to the ones that handle uni-
versal quantifier constraints. The difference is that
existential quantifiers are unfolded to tri-logical dis-
junctions.
5.3 Compiling SPL
For the purpose of consistency verification, SPL poli-
cies should be seen as operator definitions, which are
used to state event constraints. The goal of the SPL
compiler is to generate the rules necessary to handle
each of these types of constraints.
Since SPL is a constraint language, translating it
into CHR is a direct process. Each policy is seen as a
complex constraint composed by other simpler con-
straints. Thus, each policy definition is translated
into one simplification rule, with one user-defined
constraint in the head, several constraints in the body
and no guard. The constraint in the head is a predi-
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cate with the policy’s name, applied to a tuple with
a SPL rule representing the policy, every explicit
policy’s parameters and four implicit ones: current
event, global and local variables. The body of the rule
is composed by one constraint for each SPL group or
rule definition inside the policy. These constraints
can then be further simplified by the rule of the con-
sistency engine.
private(Event, OrgUsers, Locals, Globals, R) ⇔
Event = event(Actor,Action,Target,Pars, Time),
Locals = locals(private vars(IDocs)),
R = r( Action = “SendMail” ∧ Target ∈ IDocs,
Pars[1] ∈ OrgUsers).
Figure 12: The figure shows the translation of the
SPL policy of Figure 8 to CHR.
Figure 12 shows the translation of the SPL policy
presented in figure 8. The policy is translated into a
simplification rule with two constraints in the body.
One of the constraints states that the set “IDocs”
is defined inside the predicate “locals”, in the “pri-
vat vars” section. The other states that the SPL rule
to apply is defined by the predicate “r” applied to the
tuple composed by the applicability and acceptability
expressions.
Although most policies can be translated into a
single CHR rule, some require more than one rule,
and some require special handling to increase per-
formance. For instance, as referred in the previ-
ous section, existential quantifiers are unfolded to
tri-logical disjunctions of each of the quantification’s
elements, which in turn derive built-in disjunctions
that may compromise performance due to backtrack-
ing. In some situations, existential quantifiers are
transformed into conjunctions of two constraints by
a process known as Skolemization [10]. This trans-
formation is possible if the set of the quantification
is not empty and the applicability expression of the
SPL rule does not depend on the quantification vari-
able. Under these conditions, the existential quan-
tification “∃x ∈ A : rule(x)” is equivalent to “c ∈ A
and rule(c)” where “c” is a Skolem constant.
5.4 Security self-consistency
A security policy may be inconsistent in several ways.
For instance, a security policy which is never appli-
cable is unnecessary, thus inconsistent. On the other
hand, a security policy that denies every event is also
inconsistent. Several other inconsistency definitions
may be devised. Currently, our prototype is able to
check four types of policy inconsistencies:
• Inapplicability: the policy is never applicable;
• Monotonic denial: the policy denies every event;
• Monotonic acceptance: the policy accepts every
event;
• Rule redundancy: one or more rules in the policy
are redundant.
Verifying the first three types of inconsistency is
straightforward. It is only necessary to find a solution
for the event variable on each of the following goals:
E ∈ AllEvents, myPolicy(E, . . . , r(D,A)), D.
E ∈ AllEvents, myPolicy(E, . . . , r(D,A)), ¬D ∨A.
E ∈ AllEvents, myPolicy(E, . . . , r(D,A)), ¬D ∨ ¬A.
The fourth type is slightly more complex. Briefly,
the verifier should replace, in turn, each of the rules
to check for redundancy, by a dummy rule with an
empty applicability domain, and check for differences
between the original policy and the modified policy.
commutativity @ R1 diffR2 R2 diffR1 ⇔ true.
identity @ R diffR ⇔ fail.
definition @ r(D1, A1) diff r(D2, A2)⇔
(D1 ∨˙D2) ∨ ((D1 ∧ A1) ∨˙(D2 ∧ A2)).
Figure 13: Rules to handle the diff operator. This
operator restraints two SPL rules to be different
The replacement of each rule by the dummy rule is
done by the underlying platform. The actual test for
policy differences is done by the diff operator (Fig-
ure 13), which restraints the “query” rules of each
policy to be different. If this constraint fails, this
means that both the original and the modified poli-
cies are equal and the replaced rule is redundant.
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6 Workflow Rules
Most specifications comprising constraints within an
organization are eligible to be checked for consistency
together with the organization security policy. The
specific importance of workflow specifications results
from being usually used all over the organization, po-
tentially crossing different security management do-
mains, thus increasing the probability of occurring
inconsistencies.
Although workflow specifications are usually cre-
ated by a graphic tool, and kept inside a workflow
framework in an internal format, several workflow
frameworks also support the “Workflow Process De-
scription Language” (WPDL) [15] for specification
interchange purposes. Given the interchange purpose
of WPDL we have found it to be the ideal language to
test the verifier’s ability to express and handle work-
flow specifications.
In this section we briefly describe WPDL. Then we
describe howWPDL is translated into CHR, and why
the workflowCH for WPDL is empty. Finally, we give
some examples of cross-consistency goal definitions.
6.1 WPDL
WPDL’s main entities are: activities, participants
and transitions. Each activity is a logical, self-
contained unit of work within the workflow defini-
tion, performed by a participant. An activity may be
atomic, a sub-flow, loop activity or a dummy activity.
Atomic activities are the ones which are going to
be activated by events and therefore controlled by
the security policy. A sub-flow activity is just a con-
tainer for a sequence of activities. A loop activity is a
special control activity comprising a loop condition.
For each loop activity there are two special transi-
tion entities pointing from and to it. The outgoing
transition points to the loop’s start activity. The in-
coming transition points from the loop’s end activ-
ity. Dummy activities are used to support routing
decisions within the incoming and/or the outgoing
transitions.
Transitions are comprised by three elementary
properties: the from-activity, the to-activity, and the
activation condition. Transitions execution may lead
to sequential or parallel activities execution. The in-
formation related to split and join properties is de-
fined within the appropriate activity.
The join property decides if the activity requires
the activation of only one or every incoming transi-
tion. The split property decides if, after the activity
is performed, every outgoing transition is activated
or if only one of them is activated. In the latter case
the activated transition is chosen from a priority list.
If the first transition cannot be activated due to its
activation condition, the next transition is chosen.
Participants are resources that may be assigned to
activities. A participant may be a person, a role,
an application (automated activity), or an organiza-
tional unit.
Participant = Manager
Action = Submit Expense
Split = only one: T0, T1
From = A0
To = A2
Condition= otherwise
Participant = Director
Action = Aprove Expense
From = A0
To = A1
Condition = Expense.cost < 1000
Participant = Manager
Action = Approve Expense
A0
T1
A2
T0
A1
Figure 14: A workflow definition example: Ai stands
for activity i and Ti stands for transition i.
Figure 14 shows an example of a workflow defini-
tion. “Activity 0” is performed by a Manager and is
an expense submission. After being executed, “activ-
ity 1” enables two transitions, but only one of them
can be executed. It first tries “transition 0”, if the
expense’s cost is less than 1000 then “transition 0”
is executed and “activity 1” becomes enabled, other-
wise “transition 1” is executed and “activity 2” be-
comes enabled.
6.2 Compiling WPDL
For the purpose of consistency verification, each
WPDL activity specification is seen as the definition
of a specific type of logical operator, to state event
constraints. These constraints fail when the event is
incompatible with the activity. For instance, when
the author of the event is different from the partici-
pant required by the activity.
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Transitions may also be seen as logical event oper-
ators. The purpose of these operators is to establish
temporal constraints between events enacting the to-
and the from- activities of the transition.
The WPDL compiler generates the CHR rules for
handling these constraints. However, due to the
WPDL’s simplicity it is not necessary to provide aux-
iliary CHR rules, such as the ones comprising the se-
curity constraint handler (section 5.2). Thus the spe-
cific workflow constraint handler for WPDL is empty.
a0(E, Globals) ⇔
E = event(Actor,Action,Target, , ), E ∈ AllEvents,
Actor ∈ Clerk, Action = “Build”, Target = Budget.
a1(E, Globals) ⇔ t0(E, Globals),
E = event(Actor,Action,Target, , ), E ∈ AllEvents,
Actor ∈ Clerk, Action = “Approve”, Target = Budget.
a2(E, Globals) ⇔ t1(E,Globals),
E = event(Actor,Action,Target, , ), E ∈ AllEvents,
Actor ∈ Boss, Action = “Approve”, Target = Budget.
t0 test(E, Globals) ⇔ Budget = budget(Cost), Cost < 1000.
t0(E, Globals) ⇔ t0 test(E,Globals), a0(PreviousE,Globals),
E = event( , , , , T), E ∈ AllEvents,
PreviousE = event( , , , , PreviousT), PreviousT < T.
t1 test(E, Globals) ⇔ ¬ t0 test(E, Globals).
t1(E, Globals) ⇔ t1 test(E, Globals), a0(PreviousE,Globals),
E = event( , , , , T), E ∈ AllEvents,
PreviousE = event( , , , , PreviousT), PreviousT < T.
Figure 15: This figure shows the translation of the
workflow of Figure 14 to CHR. AllEvents, Clerk,
Budget and Boss variables are defined within Globals
(not shown for simplicity)
Figure 15 shows the rules resulting from the compi-
lation of the workflow definition of Figure 14. Activ-
ity constraints are simplified to conjunctions of basic
constraints on event properties and of transition con-
straints.
Transition constraints are simplified to basic con-
straints and activity constraints. The actual con-
straint simplification of transition constraints is di-
vided into two simplification rules, to assist in ex-
pressing dependency on other transitions, when they
are in the same split priority list. For instance, the
constraints of type t1 depend on the failure of the
test condition of constraints of type t0.
6.3 Workflow/Security consistency
A workflow specification may be inconsistent with a
security policy in several ways. For instance, a work-
flow may be inconsistent if at least one of its activities
cannot be executed under the security policy. It may
also be inconsistent if there is no activation path be-
tween its start activity and its end activity allowed
by the security policy.
The last situation is particularly interesting since
it reflects the impossibility of performing the work
for which the workflow was conceived. To verify this
inconsistency it is only necessary to find a solution
for the event variable E which satisfies the goal:
E ∈ AllEvents, lastActivity(E, . . . ),
forall(AllEvents, T r(. . . ), R).
where
Tr(E, . . . , R) ⊢ masterPolicy(E, . . . , R), close(R).
The first line of the above goal states that there
is an event, belonging to the events set, which satis-
fies the last activity constraints. Since, by definition,
the last activity implies the existence of an event for
each of the preceding activities, the goal states the
existence of an event for each activity from the start
activity to the end activity. The second line of the
consistency goal states that every event must also
satisfy the security policy, thus stating consistency
between the two specifications.
The “close” constraint is an auxiliary constraint
which specifies the behaviour of the security service
when a security policy does not apply to an event.
With the close assumption, the service denies those
events. With the open assumption, the service allows
those events. The rules to handle the “close” and
“open” constraints are defined as:
open r(D1, A1) ⇔ ¬D1 ∨ (D1 ∧A1).
close r(D1, A1)⇔ D1 ∧A1.
These rules have another important function.
They act as the bridge between the tri-value logic
used by the security constraints and the binary logic
used by the workflow constraints.
Although we have not exhaustively tested with
many different inconsistency types, the results we
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have obtained so far and the flexibility of the under-
lying platform, lead us to believe that PCV is able to
find most types of inconsistencies within and between
security policies and other specifications.
7 Related work
The security inconsistency problem has been ad-
dressed by many authors. Some solve conflicts within
security specifications by adding implicit rules to in-
complete specifications [11, 5, 12]. Others detect in-
consistencies in security properties within workflow
specifications [6, 4].
Jajodia et al [11] define a logical language with
ten predicate symbols to express security policies.
Three of them are authorization predicates (der-
cando, cando, do), used to define the allowed ac-
tions. Although not explicitly, these predicates de-
fine three authorization levels with “dercando” as the
weakest and “do” as the strongest. The “do” pred-
icates are used to solve conflicts between “cando”
predicates. “dercando” predicates are derived from
“cando” predicates, and are overridden by “cando”
predicates when in conflict.
Another approach to conflict resolution, presented
in [5] and [12] uses elements such as rule authorship
authority, rule specificity and rule recency to prior-
itize rules. Although simple and natural, this ap-
proach may lead to undesired behavior. It is not un-
common for a high authority manager to issue a rule
which may be overridden by a low authority man-
ager, or to express a mandatory general rule which
should not be overridden.
Bertino et al [6] also use constraints to detect in-
consistencies of roles assignment to workflow tasks,
and to plan effective inconsistent-free role assign-
ments. Although the work is able to model several
types of restrictions on role assignment, namely sev-
eral forms of separation of duty, it does not consider
any other kind of security or workflow restrictions.
Atluri and Huang [4] use a different approach to
detect inconsistencies between security and workflow
specifications. They model security and workflow
restrictions as Petri nets, and state that the safety
problem in the authorization model is equivalent to
the reachability problem in that type of nets. They
assume a model where authorization restrictions are
the subset of workflow restrictions that specify users
and roles authorizations.
However, to our knowledge, the general problem of
inconsistency detection on complex security policies,
comprising several types of inconsistency, including
inconsistencies with other specifications, has never
been addressed by any author.
8 Conclusions
We have defined a tool (PCV) to detect inconsis-
tencies within security policies and between secu-
rity policies and workflow specifications. PCV is
able to detect several inconsistency types within se-
curity policies defined with the SPL language, which
is able to express complex security polices, and be-
tween those security policies and WPDL workflow
specifications.
PCV is easily adapted to each organization’s needs
by allowing the definition of other inconsistency types
and target specifications.
Currently, our prototype has approximately 300
CHR rules running over the CHR solver provided
with SICstus Prolog [3], and is able to handle all
SPL and WPDL constraints. Some experiences have
been performed using compositions of SPL policies
and workflow specifications to validate the process.
Namely, we have tested several workflow specifica-
tions with security policies comprising separation
duty, information flow, and other types of security
policies, with promising results.
This work is part of a security platform which also
includes a security language able to simultaneously
express several complex security policies –the SPL
language– and a compiler which is able to enforce it
efficiently within an event monitor service.
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